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ABSTRACT
This report describes an experiment in dynamically testing flight
software with assertions. Digital flight control system software was
used as a representative test case. The experiment showed that Q7% of
typical errors introduced into the program would be detected by
assertions, thus demonstrating that assertion testing would provide a
good basis for a flight software testing methodology. Detailed analysis
of the test data showed that the number of assertions needed to
detect those errors could be reduced to a minimal set. The study also
revealed that the most effective assertions provided greater collateral
testing of the program parameters than those assertions detecting fewer
errors.
s.'e~-x-Index JEe^ ms:'' 'Software Testing, Fault Tolerance, Testing
Method>gy, Flight Software.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Center for Reliable Computing at Stanford University has
completed a two year study on the application of executable assertions
to testing flight software. The purpose of this study is to develop a
methodology for testing real-time flight software. Prior to this study,
the results from other research projects had already demonstrated the
practicality and effectiveness of assertion testing [Andrews 78-81].
However, even though assertions had proved to be successful in detecting
errors in other types of software, it was important to show they could
be used for testing flight software because it has different
characteristics. (Flight software is real-time, has many logical
variables, and uses fault- tolerant techniques, such as, voters and
limiters built into the software.)
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of assertions in
detecting errors in flight software, an experiment was conducted using
Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) software as a test case [DFCR-96
80], Assertions were written and embedded in the code, then errors were
inserted (seeded) one at a time and the code was executed. The results
from this experiment showed that 87% of the errors introduced into the
DFCS program would be detected by assertions.
Following the experiment, analysis of the research results
demonstrated the following:
* Assertions are effective in detecting errors in digital flight
control system software.
* Assertion testing can reduce the time and cost of testing
flight software in simulators and in actual flight.
* The variables that are most dependent on other variables
provide the greatest collateral testing and, therefore, the
assertions that test the most dependent variables are the
most effective and detect the largest number of errors.
* Placement of assertions is an important factor in determining
the effectiveness of an assertion, since those assertions
placed at the end of modules detected the most errors.
* Assertions can be used as a basis for implementing fault-
tolerant techniques in flight software because they have an
excellent error detection rate and can have a low overhead.
* Assertions can be executed independently of the main processor
by using a separate "watchdog" processor to reduce the overhead
of assertion testing.
The fact that assertion testing proved to be effective for flight
software has far reaching implications. The major one is that assertion
testing can be used to eliminate errors at an earlier stage in the
development cycle than before. Testing flight software has been
extremely costly and time consuming because the elimination of errors
has been done primarily by using simulators followed by actual flight
testing. If the number of simulations and flights can be reduced
because errors are detected sooner, there should be a considerable
reduction in time and money spent on testing.
Many potential applications for assertions have not yet been fully
explored. Due to their excellent error detection capability, assertions
can provide detection for faults that can be corrected by fault
tolerance techniques incorporated in the software. The use of
assertions, however, is not limited solely to testing or fault-tolerant
applications. System specifications and requirements can be expressed
in assertions before implementation of the code as an aid in writing
assertions, as well as in providing documentation throughout the entire
software cycle.
In this paper, background information about assertion testing is
presented first, then a description of the experiments, followed by a
discussion of the research results and a conclusion.
2. ASSERTION TESTING
Assertion testing is a technique for dynamically testing software
by adding additional statements, called assertions, to the software. An
assertion states a condition or specification in the form of a logical
expression. During execution of the program, the assertion is evaluated
as true or false. If it is true, then the condition is true at that
particular point in the program; if it is false, then an error has
occurred. Notification of the error is most often made in an output
message, such as, "Assertion in module <xxxx> at statement # <nn> is
false."
Assertions are written in the same language as the software, but
they usually have a slightly different format (typically beginning with
the word ASSERT) so they can be distinguished from the rest of the
software. Before the program can be executed, the assertions must be
translated into code that is acceptable by the compiler. This
translation is done by a preprocessor, program analyzer, or a pre-
compiler. Assertions are frequently made conditionally compilable, so
they can be turned into comment statements and easily stripped out of
the code after testing is complete.
Assertions may be placed appropriately throughout the software,
although sometimes they need only be added to certain strategic modules
and still retain their effectiveness. An assertion can test the
relationship between one or more variables, the range or limit of a
variable, or check the results of a numerical computation. Some
examples of assertions are:
ASSERT (ABS (LAT_INN_CMD) > MAX_CPL)
ASSERT (ABS (K2 - 0.95133) > 0.0005)
ASSERT (ABS ((LAT_INN_CMD) - 0.5 « (RL5 + 0.753 * ROLL)) > 0.0001)
2.1 PROCEDURE FOR ASSERTION TESTING
Assertion testing differs from other forms of dynamic testing of
software because assertions must be added to the code before it is
executed. Assertion testing has two distinct advantages over other
testing methods: First, determining the correctness of the output is
remarkably simplified because of the automatic notification of an error
when an assertion is violated. Second, because of this reduction of
time required for assessment of test results, the generation of a larger
set of input data becomes possible and automation of the process of
adaptively generating test data becomes easier to implement [Andrews
81,85], [Cooper 76]. However, the generation of input test data can be
the same as is used in any other testing procedure [Adrion 82], [Duran
84], [Gannon 79], [Howden 80], [Ntafos 85]. The procedure in testing
software with assertions is as follows:
* Add assertions to the code - preferably this should be done
during code implementation.
* Execute the code to test the correctness of the assertions.
* Generate test case data automatically or by the usual testing
methods.
» Input test data and execute the software.
* When testing is complete, assertions may be removed or left in
the code during deployment.
2.2 FAULT-TOLERANT APPLICATIONS
Another important use of assertions is in building fault-tolerant
systems [Randall 753, [Andrews 79]. A designer of a fault-tolerant
system assumes that faults will occur and tries to prevent failures by
incorporating methods for error detection and correction during system
operation. Assertions embedded in the software provide a convenient and
effective way to implement on-line fault tolerance for hardware faults,
as well as software errors. Assertions are used to detect the errors,
and additional code (traditionally referred to as a recovery block)
provides a way to handle the error. When an assertion is evaluated as
false, control is transferred to the recovery block statements that are
then executed. This technique, although simplistic in concept, allows
implementation of a variety of responses to potentially critical
problems.
Due to the increasing criticality of computer applications, it has
become necessary to provide recovery from software, as well as hardware
errors. Even with state-of-the-art program validation and verification,
there can be no guarantee that the software is correct and free of
errors. The complexity of a software system is at least an order of
magnitutude greater than that of the hardware because of the enormous
number of different states in a program. This makes it possible for an
error that will only surface under a rare combination of input values to
remain undetected. Therefore, it is not surprising that residual errors
in software have been a major source of system failures [Losq 77].
Although implementation of tolerance for hardware faults has been
commonly used in the past, there are many reasons why it is becoming
even more important. For one, the problems of adequately testing
hardware are increased drastically by development of microelectronic
systems, including submicron devices, Very Large Scale Integrated (VLSI)
circuits, and large-scale electronic systems. Second, not all hardware
faults are detectible and, when more than one fault is present,
detection becomes more difficult. Because assertions can check that
data is within an acceptable range of values, they can easily detect
some types of hardware faults. For example, a typical problem that can
have catastrophic consequences is a transient hardware fault. If the
problem is due to a faulty sensor, the bad data can be discarded and a
second data point could be read or another could be calculated based on
the previous reading and the rate of change. Such simple procedures can
prevent undesirable consequences that can result from intermittent or
transient hardware faults [Andrews 79].
3. RESEARCH EXPERIMENT
This section describes the flight control software used as a test
case and the procedure followed in developing the assertions and
generating the errors.
3.1 TEST CASE SOFTWARE
The software used as a test case was the autopilot code for a
large, wide-bodied commercial airplane. It is a good example of Digital
Flight Control System software and is written in AED (Automated Engineer
Design) [DFCR-96]. The software was written incrementally over the past
decade and most of the "bugs" have been corrected. The code is almost
identical to that in use at the present time. (It is the next to the
last version before deployment.)
The software is an integrated system that provides autopilot and
flight director modes of operation for automatic and manual control of
the plane during all phases of flight. The software is partitioned into
five major categories: the first, of course, is control and navigation
of the plane. In addition to this, are various supporting functions,
namely, testing and voting, logic (engage and mode calculations),
input/output (data handling, transmission, display, etc.), and the
executive. The subset of modules chosen for testing calculates the
commands to the ailerons. They use the selected heading and data from
sensors as input. Figure 3.1 shows the relevant procedures and the flow
of data.
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Fig 3.1 Flow of Data in Test Case Software
3.2 PROCEDURE
The original plan for the experiment was to add assertions, put in
errors, and execute the autopilot code on the flight control computers
installed at the Digital Flight Control Systems Verification Laboratory
at NASA-AMES [de Feo 82], However, developing assertions involves a
certain amount of experimentation in order to refine them and measure
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the desired condition. In addition, the errors were to be seeded one at
a time so it would be possible to determine whether or not a particular
error had been detected. Each change in the code, for refinement of
assertions or inserting an error, requires recompilation of the entire
program by an AED compiler which is on a Univac computer at a different
location. Then the excutable code must be downloaded into the flight
computers on the pallet. It soon became apparent that the process of
making changes to the code was so time consuming that very fews runs
could be made in one day. For this reason, the code was rewritten in
Pascal so it could be executed more efficiently on the DEC-20 at the
Stanford University campus.
There were two other even more important reasons for moving the
code to another computer. One was that introducing errors into the code
often caused the flight computers installed on the pallet to "crash" (or
not fly at all) because the effect of the error was so drastic.
Consequently, the section of code containing assertions was never
executed. The other reason was intrinsic to the nature of the flight
computers which have a dual-dual redundancy architecture. Aberrations
are corrected by voters and limiters built into the software [de Feo
82], so errors introduced in the software running on one channel would
be "corrected" by the voters or limiters before detection by an
assertion.
In this experiment, the assertions were written by one person and
the errors by another person. The reason for doing this was to maintain
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complete independence. Since existing documentation did not contain
enough information to write assertions, the flight computers were run on
the simulator in conjunction with a strip chart recording device to
determine the normal values of the program variables. From this
information, it was possible to write assertions for the set of modules
to be tested. More detailed information may be found in the following:
a description of the experiment to test flight software with assertions
[Mahmood 84a]; suggestions for writing assertions in flight software
gained from this experience [Mahmood 8^ b], A combination of these two
papers along with additional information was published as a technical
report of the Center for Reliabile Computing at Stanford University
[Mahmood 84c].
The selection of errors was taken from two studies of errors made
during development of flight control software [Hecht 82]; one was
remarkably similar to the software we were using as a test case.
Errors, chosen from four different classifications, were seeded one at a
time in the software to determine the effectiveness of assertions in
finding errors of different types. Effort was made to duplicate exactly
the original errors whenever enough information was available.
4. ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH RESULTS
This research study can be divided into three phases: the first was
the original software testing on the flight simulators installed at the
NASA-AMES Research Center; the second was conducting the tests on the
DEC-20 at Stanford University; and the third was exploration of the
factors affecting the effectiveness of the assertions themselves. The
results from each of these phases contributed to understanding the
problems of testing flight software. This section describes the results
from each phase.
4.1 FLIGHT SIMULATOR TESTING
The results of the first phase, although not productive in
quantitative results (because of the length of time required to run each
test), contributed greatly to understanding the problems involved in
testing real-time flight software.
The first results clearly showed that testing a software system
with built-in redundancy (that is, a fault-tolerant system) is not
possible using normal testing techniques. These results also indicated
that the same problems encountered in testing fault-tolerant hardware
systems (fault masking, etc) exist for testing fault-tolerant software
systems and that "design for testability" features should be
incorporated into fault-tolerant software design specifications.
When the software was executed on flight computers in a simulated
real-time flight environment, the following major differences between
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real-time fault-tolerant software and non-real-time software without
redundancy were identified:
* In the autopilot code, there is frequent use of limiters which
reset certain variables whose values are not within certain limits.
This is done, not only to control possible errors, but also to keep
the values of those variables within the limits of passenger comfort
and within the stress limits of the airplane structure, etc.
However, this use of limiters throughout the program interferes with
detection of errors during testing because errors can be corrected
by a limiter and therefore masked.
* The values of input data, as well as the values of variables from
computations, are continually voted upon. If one of the values does
not agree with the others, the majority vote prevails. Therefore,
most errors are masked and become difficult to detect, since
propagation of errors is halted.
* The autopilot flight computers have a dual-dual redundancy
architecture with automatic synchronization of the channels provided
by the software. Under these conditions, assertions which monitor
timing do not catch errors because timing problems are immediately
corrected.
From these results, it was clear that it would be necessary to
incorporate into a flight software test methodology some of the same
concepts that have been proposed for simplifying the testing of fault-
tolerant hardware; such as, building observation points into the
software to break the system into manageable partitions, removing
redundancy during testing, and removing internal automatic channel
synchronization. Therefore, in the subsequent testing, the program was
tested as a single entity (without redundancy and synchronization).
4.2 SIMULATION ON DEC-20 COMPUTER
The initial test runs on the flight computors revealed major
differences between real-time flight software and non-real-time
software. More comprehensive testing done in this phase indicated that,
regardless of these differences, assertion testing of Digital Flight
Control System software is an effective method for detecting errors.
Eighty one errors were seeded in the program one at a time to
determine the effectiveness of assertions in finding errors of different
types. The errors were from four different error classifications - data
handling, logic, database, and computational. As Fig. 4.1 shows,
nearly 70% of the errors were detected and, if all paths had been
asserted, nearly 90? of all errors would have been detected. Assertions
were not written for the parts of the code that were not supported by
the flight simulator. Some errors (especially logic errors) caused
execution of the code without assertions and, consequently, were not
detected. The reason the remaining errors were not detected was due
most frequently to the fact that they had no effect on the computations.
For example, Boolean variables (having values of either 0 or 1) are
typically assigned a value in flight software in statements such as,
MODE = A or B or C and not D. Suppose A equals 1, then an error
resulting in a change in value of B or C will have no effect on the
outcome of this assignment statement and therefore would not be detected
by an assertion. In another example, some errors changed the name of a
Boolean variable into another. When the value of the variables was
identical, the error could not be detected.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
ERROR
TYPE
DATA HANDLING
LOGIC
DATABASE
COMPUTATIONAL
TOTAL
No.
INSERTED
22
19
19
21
81
% ERRORS
DETECTED
PARTIALLY
ASSERTED
63.6
47.3
78.9
76.1
66.6
FULLY
ASSERTED
90.9
B4.2
94.7
80.9
87.6
Fig 4.1 Types of Errors Detected by Assertions
4.3 OPTIMIZATION OF ASSERTION TESTING
Once the effectiveness of assertion testing of flight software was
established, it became necessary to explore various aspects of
optimizing the use of assertions in order to develop an efficient
testing methodology. Efforts were directed toward answering questions
about both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of assertion
testing. For example, how should assertions be written, what type of
assertions are the most effective, where is the best placement for
assertions, how many are needed, etc.
4.3.1 Writing the Assertions
From the difficulty realized in this experiment in trying to write
assertions with little knowledge of the program behavior and inadequate
software specifications, it is obvious that assertions must be written
in cooperation between a flight system analyst and a software person who
is designing or implementing the code. Some of the conditions that
should be tested by assertions would best be known to flight
specialists; and for that reason, it is imperative to have their help
and guidance. The best time to add assertions is during the original
coding, so the assertions will detect errors during module, as well as
system integration testing.
4.3.2 Number of Assertions
The number of assertions depends on the phase of testing. When
used for debugging, assertions should be embedded frequently throughout
flight software code so they can best pinpoint the location of the
errors. However, once the software is ready for testing in a flight
simulation environment, then a smaller number of assertions is desired
in order to minimize memory space in the computer and execution time
overhead.
This is also true when assertions are used for error detection in
implementation of fault tolerance techniques. In that case, the
suggested procedure is to seed the program with errors (as was done in
this experiment) and then retain a covering set of assertions, that is,
the set detecting all seeded errors. The assumption would be that those
assertions would be most able to detect intermittent and transient
hardware faults, as well as any new software errors that might be
introduced during maintainance.
Analysis of the test results showed that four errors were detected
by only one assertion. One assertion detected one of those errors and
another detected the remaining three errors. These two assertions
constitute the set of "critical" assertions, that is, those assertions
that were necessary if all errors were to be detected. Of the remaining
assertions, either one of two assertions would detect all of the errors
not detected by the two "critical" assertions. This means that out of
all the assertions written, three assertions could be used to detect all
the detectible errors. The implication of these results is that it may
be possible to find a small subset of assertions capable of detecting a
large number of errors, so space and time overhead can be minimal. This
result makes assertion testing even more attractive. Nevertheless,
suggestions for alternate methods of executing assertions in parallel
may be found in [Saib 77], [Mahmood 85d], [Ersoz 85].
4.3.3 Placement of Assertions
The placement of the assertions is also dependent on the testing
phase. During the early debugging phase, it is most desirable to have
many assertions to check incoming data, outgoing commands, data storage
and retrieval, and the results of computations. The analysis showed
that the effective and critical assertions were in the last two
procedures. This is not surprising since assertions placed earlier in
the code would not catch errors introduced later on. Although at first
it appeared that most of the errors would be corrected by the limiters
built into the software, this result demonstrated that many errors do
escape those built-in protections and that assertions can detect those
errors when the software system is tested as a single entity (with the
redundancy disabled). In the testing phases where execution time
computer space are an important factor, then assertions should be placed
in the procedures that calculate commands to the mechanical parts of a
flight system.
4.3.1 Most Effective Assertions
Assertions can be different types. They can measure the
relationship between variables, check for maximum or minimum allowable
values of a variable, or perform a numerical computation with a
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different algorithm to determine correctness of the calculation.
Examples of each of these types of assertions were given in Section 2.
Assertions also can have tests for more than one variable, and a factor
for time may also be included in the assertion. All types of assertions
were written for this experiment and, interestly enough, none of these
factors - type of assertion, inclusion of a factor for time, or checking
multiple variables - seemed to affect the ability of the assertion to
detect errors.
Further in depth analysis did reveal a factor that appears to
influence the effectiveness and criticality of an assertion. It seemed
possible that testing certain variables might be more effective than
testing others - depending on which variables provide greater collateral
testing. One measure of collateral testing is the number of variables
that are utilized in assigning a value to a variable. This number is
refered to as the "data dependency" of that variable. The variables
with the highest "data dependencies," therefore, would be expected to
provide the greatest collateral testing of other variables.
This theory was tested against the results from this experiment. A
high correlation was found between the data dependency of the variables
tested in an assertion and the effectiveness of the assertion. Those
assertions with the highest accumulated data dependency factors (for the
variables included in the assertion) proved to be the most effective in
detecting errors. The difference in detection effectiveness was
significant, since they detected ten times as many errors as the
assertions with the lowest dependency factors. Not only did the most
effective assertions have the highest data dependency factor, but the
two critical assertions also had very high dependency factors.
Therefore, to ensure that testing covers as many of the variables
as possible, the dependency factor for each variable should be
calculated and the variables with the highest data dependency number
should be included in the assertions. Discovery of this relationship
between assertion effectiveness or criticality and the data dependency
factor of the variables being tested should be of considerable help in
writing good assertions for flight software.
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5. CONCLUSION
The broad and important conclusion to be reached from this research
investigation is that assertion testing is an effective and efficient
method of detecting errors in flight software. A major implication of
this result is that assertion testing can be used effectively to
eliminate most errors at an earlier stage in the development cycle than
before. Testing flight software has been extremely costly and time
consuming, because the elimination of errors primarily has been done
using flight simulators as well as actual flights. If the number of
simulations and flights can be reduced because errors are discovered
sooner, there should be a considerable reduction in time and money for
testing.
Therefore it is proposed that assertions be added to the software
during implementation and that assertion testing be utilized from the
beginning to shorten the testing cycle. Furthermore, in fault tolerant-
computing applications, the suggested procedure is to retain the
assertions during deployment and include additional code to provide
error recovery. One of the conclusions reached as a result of this
experiment is that the number of assertions required to detect all
possible detectable errors may be a small, minimal set - therefore
making assertions a useful medium for providing fault tolerance in
flight software.
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Assertions should be written as a cooperative project by a flight
systems specialist and a software person. According to these test
results, effectiveness of an assertion was not affected by factors such
as checking multiple variables, inclusion of a factor for time, etc.
However, testing program variables that provided the greatest collateral
testing of other variables seemed to improve the effectiveness or
criticality of an assertion.
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